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Abstract
Tea Auctions across India occur as an ascending open auction, conducted online. Before
the auction, a sample of the tea lot is sent to potential bidders and a group of tea tasters.
The seller’s reserve price is a confidential function of the tea taster’s valuation, which also
possibly acts as a signal to the bidders.
In this paper, we work with the dataset from a single tea auction house, J Thomas, of
tea dust category, on 49 weeks in the time span of 2018-2019, with the following objectives
in mind:
• Objective classification of the various categories of tea dust (25) into a more manage-
able, and robust classification of the tea dust, based on source and grades.
• Predict which tea lots would be sold in the auction market, and a model for the final
price conditioned on sale.
• To study the distribution of price and ratio of the sold tea auction lots.
• Make a detailed analysis of the information obtained from the tea taster’s valuation
and its impact on the final auction price.
The model used has shown various promising results on cross-validation. The impor-
tance of valuation is firmly established through analysis of causal relationship between the
valuation and the actual price. The authors hope that this study of the properties and the
detailed analysis of the role played by the various factors, would be significant in the decision
making process for the players of the auction game, pave the way to remove the manual
interference in an attempt to automate the auction procedure, and improve tea quality in
markets.
Keywords: Tea Auction, Applied Econometrics, Auction, Common Value, Model prediction,
Price Setting, Automation, Linear Regression
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1 Introduction
Tea (Camellia sinensis) is a manufactured drink that is consumed across the world. The tea crop
has rather specific agro-climatic requirements that are only available in tropical and subtropical
climates. Tea production, therefore, is geographically limited to a few areas around the world
and is highly sensitive to changes in growing conditions. Majority of the tea producing countries
are located in the continent of Asia with China, India, Kenya, Sri Lanka and Vietnam being the
top producers (in that order), accounting for around 78% of the world tea production and 73%
of exports. World tea production is estimated at over 5 million tonnes in 2015, valued around
Rs 1 trillion. It increased by 4 percent to 5.2 million tonnes in 2014 (see [1] for further details).
China remains the largest tea producing country with an output of 2.1 million tonnes in 2014,
accounting for more than 40 percent of the world total, while production in India, the second
largest producer, remained flat at 1.2 million tonnes in 2014, contributing around 30% of would
production.
The tea industry is one of the oldest organized industries in India with a large network of
tea producers, retailers, distributors, auctioneers, exporters and packers. Interestingly, India
is also the world’s largest consumer of black tea with the domestic market consuming around
1,000 million kg of tea during 2016. India’s annual production of tea is around 1,200 million
kgs and the market size is estimated to be approximately Rs 20,000 Crore. The Tea Industry
in India also derives its importance by being one of the major foreign exchange earners and for
playing a vital role towards employment generation as the industry is highly labour intensive.
India exports around 225 million kg of tea and is the fourth largest exporter in the world with
Russia being its largest importer. The annual value of tea exports from India is around $800
million. The other major importers of Indian tea are Iran, UK, Pakistan and UAE.
Tea is heterogeneous both over season and region, and even intra-region. Varieties of tea:
90% of the tea produced in India is of CTC (Cut, Tear and Curl) variety followed by Orthodox
(9%) and Green Tea (1%). CTC tea is largely graded as Broken Leaf, Dust and Fannings. Each
of these grades has a dozen of sub-grades based on the size of the grain etc. Several factors
influence the demand for tea, including the price and income variables, demographics such as
age, education, occupation, and cultural background. Apart from consumption, other main
drivers of international tea prices are trends and changes in per capita consumption, market
access, the potential effects of pests and diseases on production, and changing dynamics between
retailers, wholesalers and multinationals (Source: [1]).
Tea demand is very price sensitive. Price elasticities for black tea vary between -0.32 and
-0.80, which means that a 10 percent increase in black tea retail prices will lead to a decline in
demand for black tea between 3.2 percent and 8 percent, according to FAO. The average weekly
volatility of CTC grade prices in Siliguri is 7%. Though the prices seem to be volatile, the tea
prices show a specific pattern. The prices are at a peak as the new crop arrivals begin, with an
increase in supplies, the prices witness a decline, lasting till the end of the season.
Due to the variation of quality, tea within the same grades are sold at a very wide range
of prices in auctions. For example on any given auction day, say Broken Pekoe (BP) variety
would sell at a range starting from as low as Rs 60 to Rs 250 per kg, depending on the producer
mark (brand), quality and demand, making standardization difficult. Moreover, a given quality
of tea is not available throughout the year. 1
Overview of e-auctions of tea: An e-auction is a primary marketing channel for selling
tea to the highest bidder. The auction system serves two basic purposes. The first purpose
is to facilitate price discovery by bringing the buyers and sellers to a common platform with
broker’s intermediation. Buyers bid for lots of tea and each lot is sold to the winning bidder.
The second purpose is that the auction system provides a guaranteed transaction protocol for
the transaction. The transaction includes activities such as delivery of tea to the warehouse,
1The details regarding the tea industry has been collected from [1], [2] and website [3].
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storing, sampling, bidding and payment (see [4] for a discussion).
Since September 2016, the auctions are pan India. It means that a member registered with
any tea trade association anywhere in India can directly participate in any e-auctions conducted
by Tea Board. Earlier, the buyer registered with local tea association could only buy from the
e-auctions taking place in respective centers. The tea auction system brings the buyers and
sellers together, to determine the price through interactive competitive bidding on the basis
of prior assessment of quality of tea. Manufactured tea is dispatched from various gardens/
estates to the auction centres for sale through the appointed auctioneers, on receipt of which,
the warehouse keeper sends an arrival a ‘weighment report’ showing the date of arrival and other
details pertaining to the tea including any damage or short receipt from the carriers. The tea is
catalogued on the basis of their arrival dates within the framework of the respective Tea Trade
Associations, the quantities are determined according to the rate of arrivals at a particular
auction centres. Registered buyers, representing both the domestic trade and exporters receive
samples of each lot of teas catalogued, which is generally distributed a week ahead of each sale
enabling the buyers to taste, inform their principals and receive their orders well in time for sale.
The auctioneers taste and value the tea for sale and these valuations are released to the traders.
Guidelines for the price levels likely to be established when the tea is sold are formulated on the
basis of these valuations and last sale price. J. Thomas & Co. Pvt. Ltd is the largest auctioneer
in the world, handling over 200 million kg of tea a year, which is one-third of all tea auctioned
in India.
Given the above complexities, the report aims to evaluate the feasibility of automating the
pricing process to the extent of dispensing with the manual testing and valuation steps. The
next section describes the data set we have used for our analysis. We first discuss the clustering
exercise according to Grade and source in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the pattern of volumes
over different months of the year. The pattern of salability of different tea lots is investigated
in section 5. Section 6 discusses the Price to value ratio to gain some insight into the pricing
pattern which finally is used fully in the pricing models developed in Section 7. A detailed
analysis of the value - price causality question is made in Section 8. The final comments on the
feasibility of automation and future plans are discussed in section 9.
2 Description of data
In this report, we have used J-Thomas datasets on the weekly tea details for Kolkata Dust
tea, Orthodox tea details, CTC tea details and Darjeeling tea details. Moreover, we have the
e-auction statistics as a part and parcel of the dataset. We have used the data in 2018 for
modelling, as the training data, and the 2019 data has been used for cross-validation. We begin
our initial modelling assuming that the model, conditioned on the relevant factors, does not
depend on the year of the auction. We shall later see in the cross-validation procedure, that
our predictions are quite satisfactory to assert that our assumption was not falsified.
The e-auction statistics (2018-19) consists of the name of tea leaf type, total lots offered in
auctions, total amount sold in packets and in quantity, and average price. For each such tea
leaf type, detailed info on the weekly sale, total amount sold in packets and in quantity, and
average price has also been provided. An initial overview of the characteristics of the data at
hand, has been produced in [5].
In the J-Thomas datasets, we find lot numbers (hence the difference between the maximum
and minimum lot number would give us the number of lots offered), the categorical variable:
the grade of the tea, number of packages offered, the valuation given by the agency, and finally
the auction selling price.
In our dataset, we have 25 types of tea grades available [6], namely,
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CD Churamani Dust CD1 Churamani Dust 1
CHD · · · CHD1 · · ·
CHU · · · D Dust
D(F) Dust Fine D(SPL) Dust Special
D1 Dust 1 D1(SPL) Dust 1 Special
GTDUST Golden Tea Dust OCD Orthodox Churamani Dust
OD Orthodox Dust OD(S) Orthodox Dust (S)
OD1 Orthodox Dust 1 OPD Orthodox Pekoe Dust
OPD(Clonal) Orthodox Pekoe Dust (Clonal) OPD1 Orthodox Pekoe Dust 1
ORD Orthodox Red Dust PD Pekoe Dust
PD(FINE) Pekoe Dust (Fine) PD(SPL) Pekoe Dust Special
PD1 Pekoe Dust 1 PD1(SPL) Pekoe Dust Special
RD1 Red Dust 1
However, there are only three main broad categories for tea dust: D1, PD and PD1
according to Wikipedia [7]. Hence our grades require clustering.
Out of the 49 weeks of data we possess, 38 weeks of auctions are from 2018, from the period
of January to December. However, since not every week had an auction, we thus have data on
weeks 2-9, 18, 20, 22-38, 40-41,43-52. Along with this, the remaining data is on the first 12
weeks in 2019, (except the 11th week, in which no auction took place), which we shall be using
for cross-validation. Hence, based on our training set, we club together the tea grades for which
there are less than 38 observations in the entire dataset (as we require at least one observation
per week on the average.) This clubbing is done by its proximity to the other tea grades, where
the proximity is based on the qualitative similarity of the grades. Thus we obtain the following
14 clubbed grades till now.
• CD: Consisting of CD, CHD and CHU
• CD1: CD1 and CHD1
• D: D and D special
• D(FINE)
• D1: D1 amd D1 Special
• OCD
• OD: OD and OD-special
• OD1
• OPD:OPD, OPD-Clonal and ORD
• OPD1
• PD: PD and PD-Special
• PD(FINE)
• PD1: PD1 and PD1-Special
• RD1
5
Figure 1: Mosaic plot for dissimilarity based on correlation across clusters (Darker shades of
blue indicates higher degree of dissimilarity)
Due to the only packet of GT Dust in the dataset, and that too remaining unsold, and further,
due to its lack of immediate similarity from any of the existing tea grades, we conclude that
GT Dust is a very rare category in this dataset, and hence we leave it out for the classification
problem for now.
3 Classification and Clustering
3.1 Clustering based on Grade
The number of clusters so formed in the previous subsection is still quite large, and we suspect
that they have quite an inherent similarity in their characteristics and hence in their market
appeal and corresponding auction transactions. To have an idea about this, we form a dis-
similarity matrix among the grades to visualize the measure of degree of similarity across the
clusters.
We form the dissimilarity matrix based on the Volume Weighted Valuations and use the
metric:
Dissimilarity(d) = 2(1− ρ2)
where ρ is the product moment correlation correlation coefficient between these time series
of Volume Weighted median Valuations for different grades. Thus we create the dissimilarity
matrices between these grades, and obtain Figure 1, where the darker shade represents a larger
value of dissimilarity, while a lighter shade shows that the clusters are similar.
One approach of clustering these is using hierarchical clustering based on this dissimilarity
measure, to obtain the following clustering dendrogram in Figure 2.
Analogously, considering Volume weighted mean valuations, we obtain Figure 3.
However, note that correlation is invariant to change of scale and origin, hence if a particular
grade has even twice a valuation than another, using correlation as a measure of clustering would
6
Figure 2: dendrogram for Volume Weighted Median Valuations based on 1-ρ2
Figure 3: dendrogram for Volume Weighted Mean Valuation based on 1-ρ2
7
Figure 4: Mosaic plot for similarity matrix based on EM-GMM using Volume weighted Mean
Price & Valuations (Darker shades of green indicates higher degree of dissimilarity))
essentially nullify the effect of even twice the valuation, and would land the two grades into the
same cluster, in spite of the fact that the grades are quite distinct in their market characteristics.
Furthermore, we need to incorporate the idea that we have the data for multiple weeks, and
the clustering should involve the clubbing for all the weeks combined.
Thus we use the following idea:
• First we use Bayesian Information Criteria to figure out the number of clusters so
that the model has the largest information. This figure came out to be 6.
• Then, we used a Gaussian Mixture Model and ran the Expectation-Maximization Algo-
rithm (often known in the literature as the EM-GMM clustering). We performed cluster-
ing both based on median as well as the mean, these two resulting in slightly different
clusterings. We stick with the median based clustering due to its robustness.
• Both the price and the valuation was considered when applying EM-GMM clustering, in
order to effectively capture the whole pattern present in the data.
Then, we define a new similarity structure, where the i-th and the j-th grade’s similarity
is proportional to the number of weeks they have occurred in the same cluster by EM-GMM
method. Thus, we form a similarity matrix with (i, j)-th entry of the matrix characterizing
the similarity in terms of number of co-occurrence weeks. The Mosaic plot corresponding to
these similarity matrices is given in Figure 4 and Figure 5. Finally based on this similarity
matrix, we conduct a hierarchical clustering to obtain the clusters, shown in Figure 7 and
Figure 6.
Thus we obtain the following 6 clusters based on grade:
• Cluster 1: OD, OD-Special, OPD1 (3 grades)
• Cluster 2: OCD, OCD1, OD1 (3 grades)
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Figure 5: Mosaic plot for similarity matrix based on EM-GMM using Volume weighted Median
Price & Valuations (Darker shades of green indicates higher degree of dissimilarity)
Figure 6: dendrogram for tea grades for volume weighted means by EM-GMM
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Figure 7: dendrogram for tea grades for volume weighted medians by EM-GMM
• Cluster 3: D-Fine, CD1, CHD1, RD1 (4 grades)
• Cluster 4: D, D-Special, CD, CHD, CHU, PD, PD-Special (7 grades)
• Cluster 5: PD-Fine (1 grade)
• Cluster 6: OPD, OPD-Clonal, ORD, D1, D1-Special, PD1, PD1-Special (7 grades)
while the GT Dust category has been left out due to lack of sufficient data points.
3.2 Diagnostics of Grade Clustering
As mentioned before, according to Wikipedia [7], the three main categories for dust type tea
leaf are D1, PD and PD1. However, our clustering algorithm shows that Tea Grade D1 and
PD1 are similar in market characteristics by putting them into same cluster. On this note, we
consider two different clusterings which might be possible.
1. Method 1: The 6 clusters as mentioned above.
2. Method 2: 8 clusters, cluster 1, 2, 3, 5 remaining as it is, while cluster 3 gets broken
into two separate clusters, one containing grades PD, PD-Special and another containing
CD, CHD, CHU, D, D-Special. Similarly, we divide cluster 6 into two separate clusters,
one containing OPD, OPD-Clonal, ORD, D1, D1-Special and another containing PD1,
PD1-Special.
To find out which one of the above clusterings would be better for further analysis, we
find out the proportion of total variation of both weekly price and weekly valuation which is
explained by the clusters. Some of the obtained results for both of the clusterings are given in
Table 1. It was found that, for both weekly price and weekly valuation, about 50% variation
of these variables over different lots are explained by the clusters alone. Also, using 8 clusters
instead of 6 clusters increases this proportion of explained variation by at most 2%, which is not
significant in contrast to the loss of simplicity of subsequent works. This diagnostic suggests us
to stick with the original clustering, with 6 clusters as defined previously.
10
Table 1: Proportion of Explained Variation of Weekly Price and Valuation by Clusters
Week
Explained Proportion of Variation
For Valuation For Price
with 6 clusters with 8 clusters with 6 clusters with 8 clusters
2 54.33% 54.81% 44.1% 44.8%
3 56.79% 57.28% 44.2% 44.5%
4 58.26% 58.77% 48.2% 50.1%
...
45 63.93% 65.27% 60.2% 61.4%
46 56.84% 57.09% 51.4% 51.6%
Figure 8: dendrogram for volume-weighted medians by source
3.3 Clustering by Source
Now, note that, if we just cluster the tea based on their grades, then we are foregoing valuable
information about the source from which the tea has been produced. This information would
be very relevant for our subsequent discussions, and it would not be a good idea to get rid of
it. Valuations about a tea grade depend on gardens they are originating from, as it utilizes the
idea about the environment used for their nourishment, soil levels, and other significant factors.
Hence the source of the tea dust is of utmost importance.
However, there are 238 tea gardens (293 including their Clonal, Royal, Gold and Special
variants) from which the tea has originated, and again as above, we suspect that maintaining
track of each of the tea gardens would be intractable as well as redundant, as the tea also
show similarity in characteristics, a significant factor of which might be geographical proximity.
Hence we undergo clustering based on the volume-weighted median to obtain dendrogram given
in Figure 8. These dendrogram has again been clustered using the EM-GMM algorithm and
then the time-based similarity matrix as in the preceding section.
Before going into the final source-based clusterings, we need to keep the following things in
mind as well:
• The districts for the source of the tea dust vary from the northern fringes of West Bengal
to the entirety of Assam. Hence it might be a good idea to keep the districts of West
Bengal and Assam well segregated.
11
Figure 9: Mosaic plot for dissimilarity based on EM-GMM clustering for source (Darker shades
for more dissimilarity)
• Geographical proximity might be a concern for the explanation of the districts that belong
to the same cluster.
• Topography, soil structure, and water source may also be the reason for similar or dissim-
ilar market characteristics of the tea dust.
• Most of the tea dust from West Bengal comes from Jalpaiguri, as portrayed in the data,
while the other districts have a significantly lesser number of such packets to be sold.
Hence it would be good if the districts of West Bengal are classified keeping this in mind.
We attach here the maps of the tea-dust producing districts of West Bengal and Assam to give
a visualization of the geographical proximities (in Figure 10 and Figure 11 ).
Thus we finally use the following 7 clusters based on the source of the tea dust.
• Cluster 1: Darjeeling, Cooch Behar (Koch Behar), Uttar Dinajpur, Jalpaiguri (4 West
Bengal districts)
• Cluster 2: Karimganj, Hailakandi
• Cluster 3: Bongaigaon, Cachar, Udalguri, Darrang, Dima Hasao
• Cluster 4: Lakhimpur
• Cluster 5: Nagaon
• Cluster 6: Sivasagar, Tinsukia, Golaghat, Jorhat
• Cluster 7: Baksa, Dibrugarh, Sonitpur
4 Distribution of Volume over Different Months
Once the clustering for tea grades and sources are obtained, the next idea would be to create
a temporal clustering. The data for 2018, presented in the form of weeks, are put into buckets
12
Figure 10: Map of North of West Bengal [8]
Figure 11: Map of Assam [9]
13
Clusters→ 1 2 3 4 5 6
Months ↓
Jan 0.099 0.134 0.105 0.056 0.038 0.100
Feb 0.070 0.125 0.082 0.037 0.000 0.085
Mar 0.008 0.018 0.019 0.009 0.000 0.016
Apr 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
May 0.027 0.010 0.008 0.031 0.018 0.015
Jun 0.108 0.052 0.069 0.077 0.053 0.059
Jul 0.129 0.091 0.100 0.125 0.025 0.098
Aug 0.115 0.109 0.114 0.129 0.109 0.115
Sep 0.139 0.155 0.123 0.138 0.177 0.128
Oct 0.051 0.062 0.089 0.090 0.184 0.096
Nov 0.084 0.086 0.132 0.129 0.191 0.126
Dec 0.171 0.156 0.160 0.179 0.205 0.162
Table 2: Tea grade proportions by months
Figures denote ratio of volume of each cluster grade occurring in that month and the total
volume of all packets of tea grade of that cluster in the dataset
of months. This is done to capture the seasonal variations in the market characteristics of tea
dust. But again the exact week number might be too redundant an information, as the tea dust
appearing in the market does not fluctuate as frequently as weeks, but might vary by seasons.
Thus, to incorporate such a possibility of market dynamics, we calibrate the data of tea dust
grades by months. This gives us the Table 2. To obtain Table 2, we find out the number of
tea packets offered in a lot and multiply it with the net average weight of the tea packets to
obtain the total amount (or volume) of tea offered. Then, for each cluster of grade, we find the
proportion of its total volume which is offered during a specified month. This gives us a basis
for clustering to analyze the supply side of market dynamics.
The mosaic plot for the above table has been included in Figure 12 for a better visualization.
5 Predicting Salability of Offered Tea lots
For analyzing the auction of tea packets, we should concern ourselves with the proportion
of tea packets to be sold, and relate its valuation and several other characteristics to it. A
successful attempt at predicting the probability of being sold (or being unsold) of an incoming
tea packet based on its Grade, Source, Valuation and the current month, would give an insight
for automating the auction process, alongside enabling an opportunity to study the effect of
Valuation on determining the market characteristics of tea grades.
5.1 A Primary Inspection
Primary inspection is made to see whether any particular type of tea grades are more likely to
be sold at the auction than other types. Table 3 shows the proportion of tea lots being sold
and the total number of tea lots offered across different grades.
Note that, Table 3 shows that Fine variant of a tea grade is offered more rarely than its
original variant, and its probability of getting sold at the auction also increases. Also, the
Special variant of any tea grade is rarer to be offered than its Fine variant, and for this reason,
there is not a significant number of observations to conclude whether it increases or decreases
the probability of getting sold at the auction.
To find out whether the probability of being sold significantly depends on the variant of tea
grades, we perform a simple one-way Analysis of Variance model with the indicator of being
14
Figure 12: Mosaic plot for proportion of Volume of tea occurring for the grade clusters across
months (Darker shades suggest larger proportions)
Table 3: Proportion of Tea Lots being Sold across different Grades
Grade
Total Lots
Offered
Proportion
of Sold
Grade
Total Lots
Offered
Proportion
of Sold
CD 1720 0.768 OD (Special) 3 0.333
CD1 1400 0.819 OD1 125 0.896
CHD 5 0.8 OPD 1064 0.822
CHD1 23 0.696 OPD (Clonal) 3 1
CHU 5 1 OPD1 61 0.754
D 7932 0.816 ORD 8 1
D (Fine) 216 0.842 PD 7119 0.771
D (Special) 6 1 PD (Fine) 111 0.945
D1 3477 0.842 PD (Special) 23 0.609
D1 (Special) 1 1 PD1 500 0.872
OCD 206 0.888 PD1 (Special) 5 0.8
OD 2229 0.796 RD1 77 0.987
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Table 4: Output for Analysis of Variance of Sellablity on variant of Tea Grades
Coefficients Estimate Std. Error t statistic p value
Regular (Intercept) 0.808 0.002721 297.20 2× 10−16
Fine 0.077 0.025131 3.10 0.00194
Special -0.098 0.063752 -1.54 0.12347
Table 5: Output for Analysis of Variance of Sellablity on variant of Tea Gardens
Coefficients Estimate Std. Error t statistic p value
Regular (Intercept) 0.808 0.002881 280.653 2× 10−16
Clonal 0.044 0.010272 4.259 2.06× 10−5
Gold -0.151 0.032931 -4.588 4.05× 10−6
Royal -0.225 0.113282 -1.987 0.0469
Special -0.027 0.013983 -1.96 0.05
sold as the response variable and the type of variant as our treatment variable. We obtain the
results as shown in Table 4. Clearly, the probability of being sold for Fine variants of tea grades
are higher than regular variant, and the p-value is small indicating that there are a significant
number of observations to support this. However, the proportion of being sold is possibly lower
in Special variants than in Regular ones, but higher p-value indicates that there is not enough
evidence to support this.
Similar to this, we tried to find out whether different variants of Source (for example,
Clonal, Gold, Royal, etc.) affect the probability of getting sold. Again we perform an Analysis
of Variance model, however, with the variant of the tea garden (or Source) as our treatment
effect. We obtain the results as shown in Table 5. From this, we note that if the tea packet has
come from a Clonal tea garden, its selling probability is expected to be higher than Regular ones
by 0.044, and the smaller value of p-value indicates evidence to support this claim. Similarly,
the tea packets produced from the Gold type variant of Garden is expected to be 15% less
probable to be sold at the auction. Also, with 95% confidence, we can say that the tea packets
produced from the Royal type variant of Garden are 22% less likely to be sold.
5.2 Model for Prediction
To build a predictive model to predict whether a tea packet will be sold at the auction or not,
based on its Valuation, Grade, Source, and the current time, we use three competing models.
1. Logistic Regression
2. Generalized Additive Model
3. Mixture of Logistic Regression
We divide the total dataset of the year 2018 into training and cross-validation sets, with the
training set containing 70% of the samples. The cross-validation set is used to select the model.
The dataset of the year 2019 is kept as a testing set, which is used to evaluate the performance of
the finally selected model for prediction. The percentage of sold tea lots is kept almost similar for
both the training and testing sets about 81%. For each of the sets, we consider each combination
of Valuation, Grade, Source, and Month, and obtain the proportion of sold tea lots among all
tea lots offered under that combination. On the other hand, the predicted probability of being
sold under that combination is estimated from the trained model. Both of these probabilities are
visually and analytically compared against each other to assess the performance of the trained
model for both sets. For analytical comparison, we use three measures as follows;
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1. Null and Residual Deviance: For a generalized linear model,
Null deviance︸ ︷︷ ︸
df
= 2 (Λ(Saturated Model)− Λ(Null Model))︸ ︷︷ ︸
df(Saturated Model) - df(Null Model)
and
Residual deviance︸ ︷︷ ︸
df
= 2 (Λ(Saturated Model)− Λ(Proposed Model))︸ ︷︷ ︸
df(Saturated Model) - df(Proposed Model)
where Λ(·) stands for the log-likelihood under the model in the argument.
The saturated model is characterized by each data point bringing in its new parameter,
ie, it provides no further scope for the addition of parameters corresponding to the data
points. Thus all n parameters are to be estimated.
The null model is the exact antipodal in the sense that it assumes a common parameter
for all the data points, and thus only one parameter needs to be estimated. The proposed
model is the model one proposes, with p+ 1 parameters.
A small null or residual deviance indicates that the corresponding one or p+1 parameter
model explains the data well. Formally, under a truly good fit, the deviances follow a
chi-squared distribution with the mentioned degrees of freedom.
2. RMSE: Root Mean Squared Error measures the L2 distance between the predicted prob-
abilities and the true probabilities. Hence smaller values are preferred.
3. MAE: Mean Absolute Error measures the L1 distance between the predicted and true
probabilities. Hence smaller values are preferred.
5.3 Logistic Regression
We began with attempting to fit a logistic regression model with the full data. The following
results came up:
• Null deviance: 18055 on 18381 degrees of freedom.
• Residual deviance: 17813 on 18359 degrees of freedom.
• Null deviance - residual deviance = 242 with degrees of freedom 22.
• Pseudo R2: 0.01340349.
• RMSE is 0.295 for training set and 0.312 for cross-validation set.
• MAE is 0.214 for training set and 0.235 for cross-validation set.
• Figure 13 shows how bad the fit is for training and testing sets respectively.
Hence this model fails miserably in predicting whether a packet would be sold.
5.4 Generalized Additive Model
We use a Generalized Additive Model with a binomial family, with a smooth cubic spline fitted
on the Valuation of tea packets as a predictor. The following results came up:
• Null deviance: 18055 on 18381 degrees of freedom.
• Residual deviance: 17627 on 18357 degrees of freedom.
17
Figure 13: Fit of logistic regression for predicting sold grades for training and testing sets
• Null deviance - residual deviance = 429 with degrees of freedom 24.
• Pseudo R2: 0.02373118.
• RMSE is 0.287 for the training set and 0.306 for the cross-validation set.
• MAE is 0.21 for the training set and 0.2322 for the cross-validation set.
• Figure 14 shows some improvement over logistic regression, but still, the fit remains too
bad to be of any use.
5.5 Mixture of Logistic Regression
We try using a mixture of logistic regressions to predict the selling potential of the packets. The
model, in general, for a mixture of S components, is given by [10] (and extended in [11], [12])
H(y|T,x,w,Θ) =
S∑
s=1
pis(w, α)Bi(y|T, θs(x))
where w stands for the concomitant variables on which the mixing proportions pis depend,
Bi(y|T, θs(x)) is the binomial distribution with number of trials equal to T and success proba-
bility θs ∈ (0, 1), is modelled by usual logistic modelling; logit (θs(x)) = x>βs. The concomitant
variable is assumed to have a multinomial logit model, i.e. of the form
pis(w, α) =
ew
>αs∑S
u=1 e
w>αu
∀s
Here, we have used our independent variable x to be the corresponding valuations, T being
the number of packets arriving, and success denoting the event that the packet is sold. The
concomitant variables are the source, grade cluster and month of the packets.
Here we consider 2 to 5 component mixture for this. Based on the Bayesian Information
Criterion, the 3 component mixture of logistic regression is chosen which yields a BIC value
6183.014.
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Figure 14: Fit of Generalized Additive Model for predicting sold grades for training and testing
sets
• RMSE is 0.222 for the training set and 0.2488 for the cross-validation set.
• MAE is 0.1522 for the training set and 0.1811 for the cross-validation set.
• Figure 15 provides the plots for fits, which shows significant improvement over the previ-
ous models. Figure 16 gives the rootogram of the components, and the peaks at 0 and 1
suggest how well these components can be identified. Note that, the observations assigned
to component 1 are marked in the rootogram. The peak at 1 for component 1 shows that
this component is well separated from others.
• Taking into consideration the metrics for fit as well as the plots, we finalize this model
to predict the probability of a particular packet of tea being sold, given its corresponding
covariates.
• As we decided to use this as our final prediction model, we can update its parameters
based on all of the training and cross-validation set. Finally, we evaluate its performance
on the testing set (comprises of data in 2019).
– Updated model achieves RMSE of 0.214 and 0.2519 in the whole training set and
testing set respectively.
– This achieves an MAE of 0.146 and 0.1684 in the whole training set and testing set
respectively.
– Figure 17 provides the plots for the fitted model for both training and testing sets.
– Table 6 provides the summary of this model.
6 Distribution of price to valuation ratio for grade clusters
Valuation by experts does provide a significant knowledge of what the final price of the trans-
action would be. The entire process runs with the base price being set at some fixed proportion
of the valuations, and thus the following price of transaction revolves significantly across this
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Figure 15: Fit of 3 component mixture of logistic regression for predicting sold grades for
training and cross-validation sets
Figure 16: Rootogram of posterior probabilities obtained from fitted model (Component 1 is
marked)
Table 6: Summary of Mixture of Logistic Regression Fitted Model
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3
Intercept Valuation Intercept Valuation Intercept Valuation
Estimate 0.5355 0.007586 -1.48 0.0117 7.2017 -0.03344
Std. Error 0.1622 0.00092 0.1819 0.00092 0.3329 0.001882
Z Value 3.3020 8.2702 -8.1369 12.7798 21.635 -17.772
p value 0.0009 2.2e-16 4.05e-16 2.2e-16 2.2e-16 2.2e-16
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Figure 17: Updated Fitted model of 3 component mixture of logistic regression for predicting
sold grades for whole training and training sets
measure. In this section, we would attempt to fit distributions over the ratio of price and val-
uations to account for its variability and shape of distribution curves. We have attempted this
exercise with the natural logarithm of the ratio of price and volume, to have full support over
the real numbers.
Observe that if, log
(
X
Y
)
∼ N(µ, σ2), then
E
(
X
Y
)
= exp
(
µ+
σ2
2
)
and
Var
(
X
Y
)
= exp
(
2µ+ σ2
) (
eσ
2 − 1
)
The histograms of the ratio of price and valuations for various grade clusters as obtained from
the data are given in Figure 18 and Figure 19.
6.1 For Cluster 1 (OD, OD-Special, OPD1)
We have attempted fitting a single normal distribution as suggested by the histogram. However,
this results in a poor fitting of the data. Hence, we attempt to fit a mixture of two normal
distributions to the data. The chi-squared goodness of fit yielded a p-value of 0.2274 and the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic yielded a p-value of 0.1588, which is quite satisfactory for our
case. Thus we report the distribution of the ratio of price and valuation of Cluster 1 to be a
mixture of two log-normal distributions with the following properties
Proportion µ σ Expectation Variance
0.1909724 -0.01608057 0.04471298 0.985 0.00194179
0.8090276 0.09976462 0.10636915 1.1111792 0.01404943
6.2 For Cluster 2 (OCD, OCD1, OD1)
The histogram shows a single modal distribution. We tried fitting a single lognormal distribu-
tion, our p-values for the chi-square goodness of fit statistic came out as 0.2665 and for One
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Figure 18: Histogram of Price/Value Ratio and Fitted Distributions for Clusters 1,2 and 3
Figure 19: Histogram of Price/Value Ratio and Fitted Distributions for Clusters 4, 5 and 6
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sample Kolmogorov Smirnov test came out as 0.6908, which suggests a reasonably good fit.
Thus we report the ratio for this cluster to follow a an unimodal log-normal distribution
with the following properties.
µ σ Expectation Variance
0.07285774 0.12655414 1.08422529 0.01897904
6.3 For Cluster 3 (D-Fine, CD1, CHD1, RD1)
The same pattern follows as in Cluster 2, unimodal from histogram, but a single log-normal fits
badly (p-value 2e-04). But fit with mixture of two log-normals give reasonably well fits (p-value
0.3855). Thus we report a mixture of two log-normal distributions with the following
properties.
Proportion µ σ Expectation Variance
0.8564837 0.07299101 0.10194329 1.081325 0.012214861
0.1435163 0.17518446 0.04294408 1.192565 0.002526254
6.4 For Cluster 4 (D, D-Special, CD, CHD etc.)
The histogram shows a unimodal and highly leptokurtic structure, thus we attempt to fit a single
log-normal distribution. However, it fits badly. A mixture of two log-normal distributions fits
reasonably better, yielding a p-value of 0.4998 for Pearsonian goodness of fit test, and a p-
value of 0.324 for Kolmogorov Smirnov test. Hence we report a mixture of two log-normal
distributions with the following properties. The closeness of the means and smaller variances
in both the components explain the reason for a unimodal looking structure in the histogram.
Proportion µ σ Expectation Variance
0.8944309 0.08910557 0.05939173 1.095126 0.004237857
0.1055691 0.08829919 0.11626259 1.099722 0.016458284
6.5 For Cluster 5 (PD-Fine)
In this case, as the histogram shows a bimodal shape, we try fitting with a 2 component mixture
of log-normal distribution. It gives reasonably well p-value, 0.8231 for Pearson’s chi-sqaured
goodness of fit test and 0.9891 for Kolmogorov Smirnov’s test. Hence we report the distribution
of the ratio to be a mixture of two log-normal distributions with the following parameters.
Proportion µ σ Expectation Variance
0.4000716 -0.004682854 0.03456505 0.9959229 0.001185728
0.5999284 0.125364986 0.05488756 1.1352709 0.00388671
6.6 For Cluster 6 (OPD, OPD-Clonal, ORD, D1 etc.)
The histogram for this cluster is characterized by its unimodality and slight positive skewness.
A single log-normal yielded a p-value of 0.0104. Hence, we moved on to a mixture of two log-
normal distributions, and this time, the p-value came out to be a higher value of 0.06225. We
also tried to fit a three-component mixture of log-normal distributions, however, that does not
increase the p-value by a significant amount. Thus we report a mixture of two log-normal
distributions with the following properties, to maintain the simplicity of the underlying model.
Proportion µ σ Expectation Variance
0.09208835 -0.00104782 0.03631677 0.9996117 0.001318753
0.90791165 0.08659977 0.10302695 1.0962629 0.012824430
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7 Analysis of the Price Model
To model the pricing system of the tea market, we consider modeling the demand side by
consideration of the Valuation of tea grades, its grade, source, and the month in which the tea
lots are available. On the other hand, to model the supply side of the market, we consider the
volume of the tea lots as our main predictor. Therefore, our pricing model should include these
variables.
To check whether the variant of the tea gardens (Clonal, Gold, Royal, Special, etc.) should
be included in the pricing model, we simply fit a one-way Analysis of Variance model with Price
as our response variable and the variant of tea garden as the possible treatment variable. It is
found that this factor explains a sum of squares of 842405 with 4 degrees of freedom, yielding
an F-statistic value of 102.41 and consequently extremely small p-value. Therefore, based on
the data, we find sufficient evidence to incorporate this factor into our pricing model in order
to have better predictability.
7.1 Nonparametric Exploration of limitations of a Pricing Model
Before specifying a statistical model for the prediction of Valuation and Price of a tea packet
based on several of its characteristics, it is extremely important to understand the limitations
of how much we can do first. To this end, it is found that there may be several tea packets
with exactly the same characteristics, (coming from the same garden, is of the same grade and
comes in the same week), and between them, the Range of their Valuations and Prices are
calculated. If we consider the empirical CDF of such all possible ranges, then as seen from
Figure 20, in most cases, those packets are subjected to exactly the same Valuation by the
auctioneers, however, the final Prices at they are sold may be very different. This exploration
suggests that if we simply do away with Valuation and output a single prediction of Price for
tea packets based on its Grade, Source, and Week of the year when it is held for the auction, we
can almost hope for 55% accuracy in prediction. However, if we wish to have a 90% accuracy
in predicting price, we must allow approximately 30 rupees of deviation from the actual price.
Even with a more robust measure of dispersion, mean deviation about median, the conclusion
of this exploration remains the same, as seen from Figure 21.
Figure 20: [Left] Empirical cumulative distribution function of the Range of Valuations of tea
packets with exactly same characteristics; [Right] ecdf of the Range of Prices of tea packets
with exactly same characteristics;
Since there are lots of Grades, Source and possible weeks combination provided in the
dataset, modeling a different prediction for each of these combinations would require a great
number of parameters in the model. However, as we have already performed a reasonable
clustering analysis of different tea grades and the source gardens, we wish to explore whether
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Figure 21: [Left] ecdf of the Mean deviation of Valuations of tea packets with exactly same
characteristics; [Right] ecdf of the Mean deviation of Prices of tea packets with exactly same
characteristics;
having a prediction for tea grades with similar cluster characteristics will be within the eco-
nomical tolerance level for the auctioneers. Figure 22 and 23 shows the corresponding ECDFs
of Ranges and Mean deviations about median of Valuations and Prices, for tea packets sharing
same cluster characteristics. As seen from them, such a model that predicts at the cluster level
would be inadequate in modeling either the valuation or the price soundly.
Figure 22: [Left] Empirical cumulative distribution function of the Range of Valuations of tea
packets with exactly same cluster characteristics; [Right] ecdf of the Range of Prices of tea
packets with exactly same cluster characteristics;
7.2 Linear Price Model
For ease of interpretability, we start with a simple linear model for pricing system with the
grade, source clusters, month of availability, variant of source garden, the volume of the tea
packet, and valuation of the tea packets as our predictors. The model is given by;
Ω1 : Price = β0 + βGrade + βSource + βMonth + βGarden + β1Valuation︸ ︷︷ ︸
Factors for Demand
+β2Volume︸ ︷︷ ︸
Supply
+ε
where ε ∼ N(0, σ2) independently and identically distributed
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Figure 23: [Left] ecdf of the Mean deviation of Valuations of tea packets with exactly same
cluster characteristics; [Right] ecdf of the Mean deviation of Prices of tea packets with exactly
same cluster characteristics;
Table 7: Analysis of Variance table for fitted linear pricing model with Valuation
Degrees of
Freedom
Sum Sq. Mean Sq. F Value p value
Grade 5 20140487 4028097 25153.19 2.2e-16
Source 6 1696940 282823 1766.07 2.2e-16
Month 10 5473468 547347 3417.87 2.2e-16
Volume 1 62247 62247 388.7 2.2e-16
Source Variant 4 186240 46560 290.74 2.2e-16
Valuation 1 13191583 13191583 82373.97 2.2e-16
Residuals 21106 3379970 160
The results from this model are summarized in Table 7.
1. Multiple R-squared for the fitted model is 0.9234, suggesting a very strong linear relation-
ship among the predictors.
2. The Analysis of Variance decomposition between different effects has been shown in Table
7. Clearly, each of the predictor variables explains a lot of variation in the price, and the
extremely small p-values indicate that each one of the variables’ contribution is significant.
3. The true price and predicted price based on the fitted linear model has been shown in
Figure 24. Note that, the predicted prices are randomly dispersed on both sides of
the reference line, thereby supporting the assumption of homoscedasticity. Also, the
standardized residuals have quantiles similar to that of the theoretical quantiles of a
standard normal distribution, as assumed by the model, other than some drastic outliers
present in both ends.
4. Based on the evaluation of the pricing model in the testing dataset, the 2.5% quantile of
the residuals is -18.59145, while the 97.5% quantile of the residuals is 23.43802. Hence,
this pricing model approximately makes an error about 20 Rupees, to both positive and
negative sides, considering a robust measure of variation.
5. On the other hand, considering a classical approach to measure the standard error, we
find the interval, with predicted value as the center and an error of 24.3229 added (or
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Figure 24: [Left] True Price vs Predicted Price for the fitted linear pricing model; [Right] The
qqplot of standardized residuals for residual diagnostics
Table 8: Analysis of Variance table for fitted linear logarithmic pricing model without Valuation
Degrees of
Freedom
Sum Sq.
(log scale)
Mean Sq.
(log scale)
F Value p value
Grade 5 835.15 167.030 5566.005 2.2e-16
Source 6 52.15 8.684 289.375 2.2e-16
Month 10 248.20 24.820 827.086 2.2e-16
Volume 1 0.564 0.564 18.779 1.475e-5
Source Variant 4 5.37 1.342 44.728 2.2e-16
Residuals 21107 633.40 0.030
subtracted) to both sides contains the true price for 95% of the time.
Comparatively, proceeding with our main objective, we remove the valuation as predictor
to see how much it affects our original linear pricing model. In this case, we find that a simple
linear model with Price of the tea packets as response variable would make the residuals to be
heteroscedastic. Therefore, we apply a variance stabilizing logarithmic transformation and use
the natural logarithm of price of tea packets as response variable. Thus the model is given by;
Ω2 : log (Price) = β0 + βGrade + βSource + βMonth + βGarden︸ ︷︷ ︸
Factors for Demand
+β2Volume︸ ︷︷ ︸
Supply
+ε
where ε ∼ N(0, σ2) independently and identically distributed. The results obtained are sum-
marized in Table 8
1. Multiple R-squared for the fitted model is 0.6431, suggesting a moderately strong linear
relationship among the predictors.
2. The Analysis of Variance decomposition between different effects has been shown in Table
8. Clearly, each of the predictor variables explains a lot of variation in the price, and the
extremely small p-values indicate that each one of the variables’ contribution is significant.
However, to our surprise, the effect of Volume has been explained by other variables to
some extent, although the volume of tea packets generates the supply side of the market.
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Figure 25: [Left] True Price vs Predicted Price for the fitted log-linear pricing model; [Right]
The qqplot of standardized residuals for residual diagnostics
3. The true price and predicted price based on the fitted log-linear model has been shown
in Figure 25. Note that, the amount of error in prediction increases as the true price
increases, thereby supporting the evidence of heteroscedasticity as previously mentioned.
Also, from the Q-Q plot, it is evident that there are some possible outliers present at lower
prices.
4. Testing the performance of the fitted model on the testing set, the 2.5% quantile of
the residuals comes as -0.29539, while the 97.5% quantile of the residuals is 0.37754 in
logarithmic scale. Hence, this pricing model approximately makes an error from 74.43%
to 145.86% of the true prices of the tea packets. This is based on a robust approach to
estimate the standard error.
5. On the other hand, considering a classical approach to measure the standard error, we
find that the predicted prices lie between 71.09% and 140.65% of the true prices about
95% of the time.
Thus the valuation part is significant for the prediction of the prices, and the process cannot
be automated by a simple linear or log-linear model approach.
8 Causal Analysis between Price and Valuation
From the simple statistical analysis with a linear model performed above, it seems Valuation
is indeed a pertinent variable in the explanation of the Pricing system. However, we could not
yet allege that the auctioneers’ valuation had a causal impact on the price level, although it
seemed to be an indispensable predictor. To evaluate the causal impact of valuation on price,
we lay down a part of the causal graph structure in Figure 26. Note that there may be some
causation structure between the variables (for example, not all grades occur in all months, hence
there should be an arrow from month to grade). Nevertheless, the variables of interest are the
valuation and the final price, and the parents to them are known, assuming we subscribe to
a linear understanding of time and causality. Thus all the other variables in the model are
parents to both valuation and price. Furthermore, valuation could be a parent of price. But, if
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the valuation is indeed an ’educated guess’ of price as was originally intended, then, since the
guess is based on only these variables; conditioned on these variables, price and valuation should
be independent trials from (possibly same) distribution. Hence, they should be independent,
had valuation not been a cause of price. Hence we aim to test this independence.
8.1 Causal Analysis with linear effect model
Figure 26: Causal Diagram for modeling Tea auction process
Thus, we wish to test whether
Valuation ⊥⊥ Price | ( Source, Grade, Volume, Garden, Month︸ ︷︷ ︸
rest
)?
However, we are faced with the fact that conditioning on so many variables render fewer data
to provide reliable estimates for any inference. Hence, we take a different strategy, which is
generally often taken when the conditioning variables are continuous. We model the log of
valuations by a linear function of the other variables, and similarly for the log of price. That is
Ω3 : log Valuation = β
>
1 rest + ε1, ε1 ∼ N (0, σ21)
log Price = β>2 rest + ε2 ε2 ∼ N (0, σ22), ε1 ⊥⊥ ε2
If these models provide a good fit, then we can look at the correlation between the residuals
to identify the presence of a causal link between valuation and price. This is because the
residuals in both the models are independent of the rest, and for two variables A,B and C, we
have,
A ⊥⊥ B|C ⇔ [A− f(C)] ⊥⊥ [B − g(C)]|C ⇔ A− f(C) ⊥⊥ B − g(C)
if A − f(C) and B − g(C) are independent of C itself. This is akin to testing for the partial
correlation between valuation and price to be 0.
The results that we obtain from the data are as follows:
• Ω3 provides a reasonably good fit, yielding the value of the multiple R2 to be 0.75 and
0.64 respectively for the two equations. The regression diagnostics checks were satisfied.
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• The correlation between the residuals of the two regression equations of Ω3 came out to
be a whopping 0.859; which cannot be attributed to sheer chance with such a large sample
size (a sample size of about 19, 000).
This has widespread implications. First of all, this substantiates that valuation of the
auctioneers is not as harmless as providing an educated guess for the price, but rather have
a causal impact on the final price. This occurs, as the base price is visible to all potential
buyers. Thus, to automate the process, whatever procedure we propose cannot be held against
the standard with how the valuation predicts price, as the predictability is nested as a causal
impact. Hence, to automate the process, a possible change in the auction mechanism is required,
and the premises of checking the success of any such alternate mechanism with this data (where
valuation has had a causal impact) would be flawed.
8.2 Causal Analysis with Three-Stage Latent Hierarchical Causal Model
The linear analysis provides substantial evidence in favor of the price- valuation linkage. But
this may be confounded with many other interactions present in the model. Recall that we
have 6 clusters for types of tea grades and 7 clusters for source or tea gardens from where
the packet came from. Together, considering their interactions, we have a 6 × 7 = 42 element
matrix. These cells are the hidden states in the model and can be interpreted as the proxies
for demands for different types of tea in the market. These states, along with several other
predictors will generate a common value about a single grade, garden, and week combination,
which shall be the true value of the tea packet to both the auctioneers and the buyers. Finally,
these prices and valuations will be characterized based on the common value and shall further
be influenced by the particular volume of the lot, which would yield the final observations. The
model that describes such a situation most closely is a variant of the Linear dynamical system
model, popularly associated with Kalman filter, as described in [13] and [14].
The mathematical framework is as follows;
Zt = FZt−1 + ξt ξt ∼ N(0, Q) ∀t = 1, 2, . . . T (1)
where Zt is a 42× 1 vector, denoting the market condition. Here, no intercept term is used,
since we wish the matrix F to be interpreted as a transition matrix over the market condition
vector Zt. One can simply identify Zt to be a non-deterministic linear dynamic system. Let, Zt
be denoted symbolically as;
Zt =

a11,t
a12,t
...
a17,t
a21,t
...
a67,t

where aij,t is the latent market condition for the demand of tea in the i-th grade cluster and
j-th source cluster, at time t. The next level of the model is;
Wgt = Φ0 + ΦWg(t−1) +GgZt +HXgt + egt egt ∼ N(0, R)
∀g = 1, 2, . . . Nt; ∀t = 1, 2, . . . T (2)
where Wgt is a scalar, which denotes the common value of the tea lot at the combination
g = (Garden, Grade) at time t, which depends on its previous observation, the current market
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state Zt and some exogenous control variables Xgt. In this case, the vector Gg has a special
structure such that;
GgZt = β1ai0,j0,t + β2
∑
i 6=i0
ai,j0,t + β3
∑
j 6=j0
ai0,j,t
where β1, β2 and β3 are parameters to be estimated. Here, g is a grade and garden combina-
tion such that the grade belongs to the i0-th cluster, and the garden belongs to the j0-th cluster
of the source. This special structure means that the common value for a tea packet depends on
the market condition of demand for that particular type of tea, as well as the market condition
of its available substitutes, which shares either the same tea grade or the same source garden,
as a potential cause for substitutability.
And finally, we have the model for the observations;
yigt = Wgt12 + Γuigt + igt igt ∼ N(0, S)
∀i = 1, 2, . . . rgt; ∀g = 1, 2, . . . Nt; ∀t = 1, 2, . . . T (3)
where yigt is the actual bivariate observation of Price and Valuation of i-th repeated measure
in g-th group combination in t-th time, while uigt is some more exogenous variables, whose
influences are incorporated only in the final stage and;
12 =
[
1
1
]
The reason we need to deviate from the standard Simple Adaptive Control Model [15] (Page
40) or the popularly known Kalman Filter model (which allows for only two indices), is that
we have more than one observations which are manifestations of the same state (i.e., three
indices), and hence, a direct influence of the states do not account for the variability within the
observations of the same state.
In the above specification of our three-stage model, we only observe the variables yigt, uigt
andXgt, and the latent variables Zt,Wgt are unobservable. Hence, we can characterize the model
with the specification of all the parameters and the unobservable latent variables, namely by
the list of elements (Zt,Wgt, F,Q,Φ0,Φ, Gg, H,R,Γ, S). Unfortunately, the above model is not
identifiable, as the new set of elements given by (αZt,Wgt, F, α
2Q,Φ0,Φ,
1
αGg, H,R,Γ, S), also
result in the exact same model. The crucial reason for this unidentifiablity is that the first
equation contains no observable variable. For this reason, we require to pose a constraint on
the model by specifying ‖Zt‖ = 1, i.e. the vector Zt’s are normalized for any t = 0, 1, . . . T .
Figure 27 shows the Causal DAG diagram for the above three-stage latent hierarchical
(TSLH) model, for a fixed time point t, the defining SCM for this are given by equations 1, 2
and 3. Note that, there are 4 exogenous variables at the second stage (as noted from the four
parameters H1, H2, H3 and H4) and only one exogenous variable in the third stage. We use
Gibb’s sampler to obtain the estimates, as discussed in the following subsection. The description
of these parameters, along with the estimated value from the dataset is given in table 9.
8.2.1 Gibbs Sampling Conditional Derivations
We begin by writing the likelihood for the Three Stage Latent Hierarchical (TSLH) model, upto
a proportionality constant.
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Zt
Z(t−1)
Wgt
Wg(t−1)
Xgt
log(Valuationigt) or (yigt)1
log(Priceigt) or (yigt)2
uigt
F
Gg or β1, β2, β3
Gg or β1, β2, β3
Φ
H1, H2, H3, H4
Γv
Γp
Γpv?
Figure 27: Causal DAG for the three stage latent hierarchical model
L ∝
∏
i,g,t
|S|−1/2 exp
[
−1
2
(yigt −Wgt12 − Γuigt)>S−1(yigt −Wgt12 − Γuigt)
]
×
∏
g,t
|R|−1/2 exp
[
−1
2
(Wgt − Φ0 − ΦWg(t−1) −GgZt −HXgt)>
R−1(Wgt − Φ0 − ΦWg(t−1) −GgZt −HXgt)
]
×∏
t
|Q|−1/2 exp
[
−1
2
(Zt − FZ(t−1))>Q−1(Zt − FZ(t−1))
]
Before obtaining the individual conditional distributions, the following observation will come
in handy:
Note that, when Y ∼ Nk(µ,Σ) as in regression model, then
f(y) ∝ exp
(
−1
2
Y >Σ−1Y + Y >Σ−1µ
)
Therefore, we can simply identify the normal distribution based on these coefficients Σ−1 and
Σ−1µ, which is a reparametrization of the parameters of normal distribution. This reparametriza-
tion shall be helpful in identifying the conditional distributions in the subsequent calculations.
We first obtain the conditional distributions for the latent variables, Zt and Wgt respectively.
Zt | rest ∝ exp
[
−1
2
{
Z>t
(
Q−1 + F>Q−1F +
∑
g
G>g R
−1Gg
)
Zt
−2Z>t
(
Q−1FZt−1 + F>Q−1Zt+1 +
∑
g
G>g R
−1 (Wgt − Φ0 − ΦWg(t−1) −HXgt)
)}]
which is a normal distribution with the above reparametrization where, Σ−1 is the coefficient
of quadratic term, and Σ−1µ is the coefficient of the linear term.
Now, with Wgt, we have;
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Wgt | rest ∝ exp
[
−1
2
{
W 2gt
(
1
R
+
Φ2
R
+ rgt1
>
2 S
−112
)
− 2Wgt
(
Φ0 + ΦWg(t−1) +GgZt
R
+
HXgt + Φ(Wg(t+1) − Φ0 −GgZt−1 −HXg(t−1))
R
+ 1>2 S
−1(yigt − Γuigt)
)}]
This leads to another normal distribution. Next, for the parameters,
Q | rest ∝ |Q|−T/2 exp
[
−1
2
tr
((∑
t
ξtξ
>
t
)
Q−1
)]
which leads to W−1 [∑t ξtξ>t ;T − 43] distribution, where W−1 is used to denoted Inverse
Wishart distribution.
Similarly,
R | rest ∝ R−
∑
tNt/2 exp
[
−1
2
(∑
g,t
egte
>
gt
)
R−1
]
which is same as the density function of Inverse Gamma distribution with shape α =
∑
t
Nt
2
−
1, scale parameter β =
1
2
(∑
g,t egte
>
gt
)
, upto a proportionality constant.
And finally,
S | rest ∝ |S|−N/2 exp
−1
2
tr
∑
i,g,t
igt
>
igt
S−1

which again leads to W−1
[∑
i,g,t igt
>
igt;N − 3
]
distribution.
Continuing,
F | rest ∝ exp
[
−1
2
{
tr
(∑
t
Z>t−1F
>Q−1FZt−1
)
− 2tr
(∑
t
Z>t−1F
>Q−1Zt
)}]
∝ exp
[
−1
2
{
tr
(
Q−1
(∑
t
Zt−1Z>t−1
)
F>F
)
− 2tr
(
Q−1F>
(∑
t
ZtZ
>
t−1
))}]
therefore,
F | rest ∼MN 42×42
[∑
t
Zt−1Z>t−1
]−1 [∑
t
ZtZ
>
t−1
]
, I,
[∑
t
Zt−1Z>t−1
]−1
Q

where MN stands for the matrix normal distribution. In other words, since the covariance
matrix between the rows of the F is I, the identity matrix, hence we can generate the rows of
F independently from multivariate normal distributions with mean vectors same as the rows of
the mean matrix, and the same covariance matrix
[∑
t Zt−1Z
>
t−1
]−1
Q.
On a similar note,
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Γ | rest ∝ exp
−1
2
tr
∑
i,g,t
u>igtΓ
>S−1Γuigt
− 2tr
∑
i,g,t
u>igtΓ
>S−1 (yigt −Wgt12)


∝ exp
−1
2
tr
S−1
∑
i,g,t
uigtu
>
igt
Γ>Γ
− 2tr
S−1Γ>∑
i,g,t
(yigt −Wgt12)u>igt


Therefore,
Γ | rest ∼MN 2×2
∑
i,g,t
uigtu
>
igt
−1 ∑
i,g,t
(yigt −Wgt12)u>igt
 , I,
∑
i,g,t
uigtu
>
igt
−1 S

To get conditional distribution of parameters corresponding to stage 2 of the model, we
assume that, GgZt = β1Z˜1t + β2Z˜2t + β3Z˜3t, with Z˜ being the proper linear combination of
latent state Zt that affects the common value Wgt. Let us also denote the vector of parameters,
θ =
[
Φ0 Φ β1 β2 β3 H
]
Based on this, we have;
θ | rest ∼MVN (A−1b;A−1R) where b = (∑
g,t
Wgt,
∑
g,t
WgtWg(t−1),
∑
g,t
WgtZ˜1t, . . .
)>
and
A =

∑
tNt
∑
g,tWg(t−1)
∑
tNtZ˜1t
∑
tNtZ˜2t
∑
tNtZ˜3t
∑
g,tXgt∑
g,tWg(t−1)
∑
g,tW
2
g(t−1)
∑
g,tWg(t−1)Z˜1t . . . . . . . . .∑
tNtZ˜1t
∑
g,tWg(t−1)Z˜1t
∑
tNtZ˜
2
1t . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

where MVN denotes the multivariate normal distribution.
8.2.2 Estimated values and implications
The performance of the estimated model has been shown in Figure 28 and in Figure 29. Some
of the residual diagnostics are shown in Figure 30 and Figure 31, from which it is obvious
that the residuals in logarithm scale follow an approximate normal distribution, other than
some outlying values in the tail, as well as the residuals in the original scale of price, shows a
histogram of leptokurtic distribution which closely resembles a lognormal one. The estimated
values of the parameters of TSLH model are shown in the table 9.
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Table 9: Description and Estimated values of the Parameters of Three Stage Latent Hierarchical
(TSLH) Model (For sake of simplicity, only parameters for second and third stages are shown)
Parameter Description
95%
Lower
Confi-
dence
Limit
Estimate
95%
Upper
Confi-
dence
Limit
Φ0
Intercept in the second stage of
the TSLH model. It
incorporates bias in the
estimation of latent common
utility value Wgt based on its
previous value and exogenous
variables
0.1507994 0.2425758 0.3131058
Φ
The effect of value of the latent
common utility of previous time
point has on explaining the
value for current time point
0.9623784 0.9849693 1.047248
β1
The direct effect on the value of
latent common utility Wgt by
the latent market demand Zt
−0.9382417 0.00435303 0.9869709
β2
The substitution effect on the
value of latent common utility
Wgt by the latent market
demand Zt having the same
grade cluster as tea grade in the
index g
−0.4668122 −0.0008195 0.4655594
β3
The substitution effect on the
value of latent common utility
Wgt by the latent market
demand Zt having the same
source cluster as tea garden in
the index g
−0.3721541 −0.0028576 0.4130075
H1
Effect of logarithm of the total
volume of the tea having the
grade and garden characteristics
same as g coming in previous
week, on explaining Wgt
−0.2156821 −0.1529215 −0.0791317
H2
Effect of logarithm of the total
volume of the tea having the tea
grade cluster characteristics
same as g, coming in previous
week, on explaining Wgt
−0.3688453 −0.321775 −0.2688594
H3
Effect of logarithm of the total
volume of the tea having the tea
source cluster characteristics
same as g, coming in previous
week, on explaining Wgt
−0.1018715 −0.0534532 −0.0070205
Continued on next page
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Table 9 – Continued from previous page
Parameter Description
95%
Lower
Confi-
dence
Limit
Estimate
95%
Upper
Confi-
dence
Limit
H4C
Effect of clonal type of tea
garden on Wgt compared to the
effect of regular type tea garden
0.02484161 0.0470203 0.06408
H4G
Effect of gold type of tea garden
on Wgt compared to the effect of
regular type tea garden
−0.0386021 −0.0252078 −0.0203631
H4R
Effect of royal type of tea
garden on Wgt compared to the
effect of regular type tea garden
−0.1240205 0.007148 0.244879
H4S
Effect of special type of tea
garden on Wgt compared to the
effect of regular type tea garden
0.0316522 0.034810 0.037769
R
The variance of error in second
stage of TSLH model
0.144291 0.146503 0.1483624
Γv
Effect of logarithm of the net
volume of the tea packet to be
sold on the logarithm of
Valuation of that particular
packet
0.7726263 0.7829123 0.7919209
Sv
The variance of error in third
stage of TSLH model for
estimating logarithm of
Valuation of tea packets
0.08097662 0.08535738 0.08893837
Γpv
Effect of logarithm of Valuation
of a tea packet on the logarithm
of Price of that particular tea
packet
0.966256 1.006905 1.040504
Γp
Effect of logarithm of the net
volume of the tea packet to be
sold on the logarithm of Price of
that particular packet
−0.0370133 −0.0190927 −0.001596
Sp
The variance of error in third
stage of TSLH model for
estimating logarithm of
Valuation of tea packets
0.02646 0.048802 0.090898
To emphasize the goodness of fit for the Three Stage Latent Hierarchical (TSLH) model we
obtain the following:
1. The residuals in valuation predicting component of the TSLH model makes approximately
38 rupees of error with 80% confidence and about 59 rupees of error with 95% of confidence.
2. The residuals in price predicting component of the TSLH model makes approximately 22
rupees of error with 80% confidence and about 29 rupees of error with 95% of confidence.
The results we obtain have the following notable implications:
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Figure 28: True Valuation vs Predicted Valuation in the training set and in the testing (or cross-
validation) set. A kernel smoother for lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence interval has
been shown, along with the red dashed reference line y = x.
1. Since β1 is positive, it appears that the more is the market demand for a particular type
of tea, the more is its value to the buyers. However, its small value (inclusion of 0 in
confidence interval) suggests that this dependence with the underlying market condition
is nonetheless small.
2. Since β2 and β3 are estimated to be negative, it appears that the substitution effect is
present in this scenario. The more is the market demand for the substitutes of a tea type,
the less is its utility to the buyers, who are going to ultimately sell it to the consumers.
3. Negative values of H1, H2, and H3 show that, if one type of tea has already dispatched
in the market by a large volume in the recent past, then their utility to the buyers of the
auction is going to be less.
4. An interesting thing to note is the opposite behavior of Γp and Γv when we allow an
unrestricted Γpv in the model. Generally, we expect that larger volumes of tea packets
to be sold at smaller per unit price, which is in accordance with a negative Γp value.
However, if the valuation is indeed nothing but an educated guess for the price, then the
behavior for Γp and Γv should be identical. The fact that Γv is positive suggests that the
auctioneer tries to balance for the act of the decrease in per-unit price with larger packet
volumes, by setting its valuation at a price larger than the market would expect it to be.
5. A large positive value of Γpv suggests a very strong positive dependence on the prices of
tea packets on the auctioneers’ valuation of the tea packets. However, this dependence
contains both the direct dependence of price on the valuation and an indirect dependence
of price through the mediating effect of the spurious latent variable Wgt.
8.2.3 Test of causality
Now, to answer the question about whether there is a significant direct effect from valuation to
the price, (i.e. whether the dotted arrow in Figure 27 exists or not) a very general approach
is the conditional independence test, as discussed in [16] and [17]. As shown in Figure 27, Wgt
and uigt creates a fork with log(Valuationigt) and log(Priceigt) nodes in the DAG. However we
shall require the following theorem:
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Figure 29: True Price vs Predicted Price in the training set and in the testing (or cross-
validation) set. A kernel smoother for lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence interval has
been shown, along with the red dashed reference line y = x.
Theorem 8.1. The estimated Γpv based on equation 3 where Wgt is substituted by the samples
obtained from the Gibbs sampler, converges in distribution to the Γpv estimated using the true
value of the latent variables (although unknown).
Proof. We shall use f(·) and F (·) as a generic symbol for density and distribution function of
a probability distribution, respectively.
Let, W
(r)
gt,k be the samples taken from the simulated k-th Markov chain in Gibbs sampling,
after r iterations (i.e. after r transition steps of the Markov chain), for the latent variable Wgt.
It is well known that under certain regularity conditions such as positivity and connected of
the conditional densities the simulated Markov chain will converge to a stationary distribution
which is the desired posterior distribution, as shown in [18]. Therefore, as r → ∞, we should
have W
(r)
gt,k
L−→Wgt,k, where Wgt,k is a random variable following the posterior distribution with
density f(Wgt | data). Here, the notation L−→ is used to denote convergence in distribution for
random variables.
Hence, the joint distribution of the observed data together with the posterior samples from
Gibbs sampling, converges to the joint distribution of the observed data together with unob-
served latent variables.
F
(
yigt, uigt,W
(r)
gt,k;∀i, g, t
)
= F (yigt, uigt;∀i, g, t)F
(
W
(r)
gt | yigt, uigt;∀i, g, t
)
L−→ F (yigt, uigt;∀i, g, t)F (Wgt | yigt, uigt;∀i, g, t)
= F (yigt, uigt,Wgt,k; ∀i, g, t)
where we use the fact that W
(r)
gt
L−→Wgt means the distribution function converges pointwise.
Now the proof follows once we note that, Γpv, as a regression estimate, is a continuous
function of yigt, uigt and Wgt. Therefore, by continuous mapping theorem,
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(a) Normal Q-Q plot for residuals in estimating
valuation
(b) Histogram of the residuals of valuation
model in estimating auctioneer’s valuation
Figure 30: Residual diagnostics plots for valuation predicting component of TSLH model
∑
i,g,t
uigtu
>
igt
−1 ∑
i,g,t
(
yigt −W (r)gt,k12
)
u>igt
 L−→
∑
i,g,t
uigtu
>
igt
−1 ∑
i,g,t
(yigt −Wgt12)u>igt
 (4)
Let, Γˆ be the regression estimate if the true value of Wgt were known, while Γ˜
(r)
k be the
regression estimate where Wgt is substituted by the posterior sample W
(r)
gt,k.
Then, equation 4 simply means Γ˜
(r)
k
L−→ Γˆ, and hence particularly one entry of the matrix
Γ˜
(r)
pv,k
L−→ Γˆpv. Thus, the result follows.
There are particularly two remarks to be made relating to the above theorem.
1. Γ˜
(r)
pv,k is not the posterior samples obtained from the Gibbs sampling, but rather a regres-
sion estimate based on the posterior sample W
(r)
gt,k.
2. Using this theorem, we know that under the null hypothesis that valuation has no direct
causal effect on price in the TSLH model, a test for H0 : Γpv = 0 can be conducted using
the regression estimate based on the proxies of the latent variables obtained from Gibb’s
sampler values. In other words, for each Markov chain, we can obtain samples Γ˜
(r)
pv,k, and
as r →∞, these samples behave like independent and identically distributed samples from
the distribution of Γˆpv. Therefore, we can simply use the Hybrid confidence sets obtained
from the Gibbs sampling to test our hypothesis.
To test the causality from log(Valuationigt) to log(Priceigt), we shall require a conditional
independence test between these two variables conditioned on the value of Wgt and uigt. In the
given model, such independence would hold if and only if Γpv = 0. Therefore, in view of the
above theorem, using the posterior samples W
(r)
gt,k, we obtain the estimate of Γˆ as 1.006317, and
the 95% confidence set turns out to be (0.981592, 1.020155), which does not contain 0, thereby,
showing sufficient evidence against the null hypothesis of conditional independence.
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(a) Normal Q-Q plot for residuals in esti-
mating price
(b) Histogram of the residuals of valuation model in
estimating price
Figure 31: Residual diagnostics plots for price predicting component of TSLH model
On the other hand, based on the fitted model, let us consider the residuals from Valuation
predicting component, and the residuals from Price predicting component (leaving Valuation as
an explanatory variable), and denote their product moment correlation as rpv. In other words,
rpv = cor (log(Valuationigt)−Wgt − Γv log(Volumeigt), log(Priceigt)−Wgt − Γp log(Volumeigt))
Tracking this correlation where the latent variables and parameters are substituted by poste-
rior samples obtained from the Gibbs sampler, we obtain the posterior mean of rpv as 0.7819911.
In contrast to that, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the logarithms of those vari-
ables valuation and price is 0.9573915, and the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between those
variables valuation and price without any transformation is 0.9609977. Note that, the correla-
tion between the residuals obtained from the causal linear model described before was 0.859.
Therefore, we find that, the linear model was enough to structurally model some of the depen-
dence, while the TSLH model was further able to reduce the correlation by explaining temporal
dependence structure within the data. However, there was still unexplained correlation, which
was simply a manifestation of the causal relationship between auctioneers’ valuation and the
ultimate selling price at the auction.
9 Remarks on Automation of the Process and Conclusion
The preceding sections show us the utmost significance of the manual valuation of the tea
packets that come in, in predicting the final price level. Thus the hope of automating the entire
procedure seems unrealistic.
However, since this valuation is based on the inherent characteristics of the tea dust packets,
and the volume of packets that arrive, we strongly believe that the practice of using valuations
to set base prices can be done away with. George and Hui, in their paper [19], provide an
ingenious way to estimate demand in the auction market, under the Independent Private Value
Model second-price auctions. A generalization of this method, in this regard, to the Common
Value (CV) [20] case, where the optimal symmetric bidding strategies are not the bidder signals
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themselves, but a monotonic function of their signals, may be helpful in our case. Then, knowing
the distribution of the bidder values, an optimal reserve price may be set to maximize the ex-ante
expected revenue, which is a function of this distribution.
Levin and Smith, in their paper [21], have shown that under the non-IPV case, the optimal
reserve price for the seller converges to her true value - here it’s her manufacturing costs. Hence
if the pool of bidders grow, then it would be safe for the seller to set the reserve price at her
manufacturing costs.
Collusion among the bidders is often a very practical problem to ponder about, and most
methodologies fail under scenarios not robust to such behavior. For example, in second-price
auctions, one source of asymmetric equilibrium, (when the distribution has a support [0, ω]) is
for one bidder to bid ω and the others to bid 0(or the minimum possible price). This is often
realized in real-life scenarios, e.g. spectrum auctions. This is a possible solution here, and given
that several auctions occur regularly in this market, bidders can sequentially alternate the role
of the highest bidder, and thus can all be better off, at the cost of the seller. Our pricing model
provides a way to detect such behavior on the part of the bidders. Since our pricing model
with valuations provides an excellent fit to the true prices, this can be used to detect collusion.
As in the case of collusion, the final price of the transaction would be low compared to the
expected transaction price, a large deviation from the predictions would indicate the presence
of such collusion. Our prices, with the estimated parameters, approximately follow a normal
distribution, thus a low p-value from this distribution could be used as an indication of collusion
of bidders.
Further research on the aforesaid aspects could bring exciting breakthroughs in the path of
automation.
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